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ABSTRACT
We examine the evidence on episodes of large stances in fiscal policy, both in cases of fiscal stimuli
and in that of fiscal adjustments in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Fiscal stimuli based upon
tax cuts are more likely to increase growth than those based upon spending increases. As for fiscal
adjustments, those based upon spending cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits
and debt over GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases. In addition, adjustments on the spending















As a result of the ﬁscal response to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 the US will
experience the largest increases in deﬁcits and debt accumulation in peacetime.
Virtually all other OECD countries will also face ﬁscal imbalances of various sizes.
After the large reduction in government deﬁcits of the nineties and early new cen-
tury, public ﬁnances in the OECD are back in the deep red.
Only a few months ago the key policy question was whether tax cuts or spend-
ingincreaseswereabetterrecipeforthestimulusplanintheUSandothercountries
as well. By and large these decisions have been taken, and we are in the process
of observing the results. The next question which governments all over the world
will face next year, assuming, as it seems likely, that a recovery next year will be
under way, is how to stop the growth of debt and return to more “normal” public
ﬁnances.
The ﬁrst question, namely whether tax cuts or spending increases are more
expansionary is a critical one, and economists strongly disagree about the answer.
It is fair to say that we know relatively little about the effect of ﬁscal policy on
growth and in particular about the so called ﬁscal multipliers, namely how much
one dollar of tax cuts or spending increases translates in terms of GDP. The issue is
very politically charged as well, since right of center economists and policymakers
believe in tax cuts and the left of center ones believe in spending increases. While
the differences are often rooted in different views about the role of government and
inequality, not so much about the size of ﬁscal multipliers, both sides also wish
to "sell" their prescription as growth enhancing and more so than the other policy.
Unfortunately both sides can’t be right at the same time!
As far as reduction of large public debts the lesson from history is reasonably
optimistic. Large debt/GDP ratios have been cut relatively rapidly by sustained
growth. This was the case of post WWII public debts in belligerent countries; it
was also the case of the US in the nineties when without virtually any increase in
tax rates or signiﬁcant spending cuts, a large deﬁcit turned in a large surplus.1 In
the UK the debt over GDP ratio at the end of WWII was over 200 percent but that
country did not suffer a ﬁnancial crisis due to its historically credible ﬁscal stance
and the debt was gradually and relatively rapidly reduced. However, it would be
probably too optimistic to expect another decade like the nineties ahead of us;
that kind of sustained growth would certainly do a lot to reduce the debt/GDP
ratio but the lower growth which we will most likely experience will do much
less. Inﬂation also has the effect of chipping away the real value of the debt but
it may be a medicine worse than the disease. While a period of controlled and
1See Alesina (1998) for a discussion of the budget surplus in the nineties in the US.
2moderate inﬂation would have the potential to reduce the real value of outstanding
debt, pursuing such a strategy would run the risk of uncontrolled inﬂation. It took a
sharp recession in the early eighties to eliminate the great inﬂation of the seventies,
and the last thing we need is another major recession in the medium run. The post
WWI hyperinﬂations are certainly not in the horizon, but we should keep them in
the back of our mind as an extreme case of debt induced runaway inﬂation.
Ifgrowthalonecannotdoit andinﬂatingawaythedebtcarriessubstantialrisks,
we areleft with the accumulation ofbudget surpluses to reign in thedebt in the next
several years in the post crisis era. But then the same question returns: is raising
taxes or cutting spending more likely to result in a stable ﬁscal outlook?
This is precisely what this papers is about. We focus upon large changes in
ﬁscal policy stance, namely large increase or reduction of budget deﬁcits and we
look at what effects they had on both the economy and the dynamics of the debt.
In particular, for the case of budget expansions (increase in deﬁcits or reduction of
surpluses) we look at which have been more expansionary on growth. On ﬁscal
adjustments (deﬁcit reductions) we consider their effect on a medium term stabi-
lization/reduction of the debt over GDP level and their cost in terms of a downturn
in the economy. We focus only on large ﬁscal changes because we try to isolate
changes in ﬁscal policy which are policy induced as opposed to cyclical ﬂuctua-
tions of the deﬁcits, which in any event we try to cyclically adjust. Our method-
ology is rather simple. We identify episodes of large changes in ﬁscal policy. Ob-
viously the decision of when to engage is such policy changes is not exogenous to
the state of public ﬁnances and of the economy. But up to a point the decision of
whether to act upon the spending side or the revenue side is largely political and
due to bargaining amongst political and pressure groups. The uncertainty about
the size of ﬁscal multipliers make this discussion even less constrained by solid
economic arguments. Thus we cannot offer new measures of ﬁscal multipliers, but
we can look at what effects have different approaches (spending versus revenue
side) have had during and after large ﬁscal changes.
Our resultssuggest thattaxcutsare more expansionarythanspending increases
in the cases of a ﬁscal stimulus. For ﬁscal adjustments we show that spending cuts
are much more effective than tax increases in stabilizing the debt and avoiding
economic downturns. In fact, we uncover several episodes in which spending cuts
adopted to reduce deﬁcits have been associated with economic expansions rather
than recessions. We also investigate which components of taxes and spending af-
fect the economy more in theselarge episodes and we try uncoverchannels running
through private consumption and/or investment.
The present paper is more directly related to several ones written in the early
ninetiesusingasimilarapproach toours. Giavazziand Pagano(1990)weretheﬁrst
toarguethat ﬁscaladjustments(deﬁcitreductions)large, decisiveandonthespend-
3ing side could be expansionary. This was the case of Ireland and Denmark in the
eighties which were the episodes studied by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), but there
were others as then discussed and analyzed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). The
same authors and Alesina and Perotti (1997) investigate various episodes of ﬁscal
adjustments reaching conclusions similar to that of the present paper. But in this
paper we have many more episodes and we use more compelling techniques. There
is quite a rich literature that studies the determinants and economic outcomes of
large ﬁscal adjustments. A non exhaustive-list includes Ardagna (2004), Giavazzi,
Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Huges and McAdam (1999), Lambertini and Tavares
(2000), McDermott and Wescott (1996), Von Hagen and Strauch (2001), Von Ha-
gen, Hughes, and Strauch (2002), and more recently, OECD (2008) and IMF
(2009). Theoretically, expansionary effects of ﬁscal adjustments can go through
both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, a ﬁscal adjustment
may be expansionary if agents believe that the ﬁscal tightening generates a change
in regime that “eliminates the need for larger, maybe much more disruptive ad-
justments in the future” (Blanchard (1990)).2 Current increases in taxes and/or
spending cuts perceived as permanent, by removing the danger ofsharper and more
costly ﬁscal adjustmentsin the future, generate a positive wealth effect. Consumers
anticipate a permanent increase in their lifetime disposable income and this may
induce an increase in current private consumption and in aggregate demand. The
sizeoftheincreaseinprivateconsumptionwoulddepend, however, onthepresence
or absence of “liquidity constrained” consumers. An additional channel through
which current ﬁscal policy can inﬂuence the economy via its effect on agents’ ex-
pectations is the interest rate. If agents believe that the stabilization is credible and
avoids a default on government debt, they can ask for a lower premium on gov-
ernment bonds. Private demand components sensitive to the real interest rate can
increase if the reduction in the interest rate paid on government bonds leads to a
reduction in the real interest rate charged to consumers and ﬁrms. The decrease
in interest rate can also lead to the appreciation of stocks and bonds, increasing
agents’ ﬁnancial wealth, and triggering a consumption/investment boom.
On the supply side, expansionary effects of ﬁscal adjustments work via the la-
bor market and via the effect that tax increases and/or spending cuts have on the
individual labor supply in a neoclassical model, and on the unions’ fall-back posi-
tion in imperfectly competitive labor markets (see Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and
Alesina et al. (2000) for a review of the literature). In the latter context, the compo-
sition of current ﬁscal policy (whether the deﬁcit reduction is achieved through tax
increases or through spending cuts) is critical for its effect on the economy. On the
one hand, a decrease in government employment reduces the probability of ﬁnding
2For models that highlight this channel, see Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Sutherland (1997).
4a job if not employed in the private sector, and a decrease in government wages
decreases the worker’s income if employed in the public sector. In both cases, the
reservation utility of the union members goes down and the wage demanded by
the union for private sector workers decreases, increasing proﬁts, investment and
competitiveness. On the other hand, an increase in income taxes or social secu-
rity contributions that reduces the net wage of the worker leads to an increase in
the pre-tax real wage faced by the employer, squeezing proﬁt s ,i n v e s t m e n t ,a n d
competitiveness.
This is not the place to review in detail the large literature on the effect of ﬁs-
cal policy on the economy. It is worth mentioning that Romer and Romer (2007)
also follow an event approach even though they identify events of large discre-
tionary changes in ﬁscal policy in a very different way from ours. Using a variety
of narrative sources, they identify changes in the US federal tax legislation that
are undertaken either to solve an inherited budget deﬁcit problem or to achieve
long-run goals and estimate the effect of such changes on real output in a VAR
framework. They ﬁnd that an increase in taxation by 1% of GDP reduces output in
the next three years by a maximum of about 3% and that the effect is smaller when
the only changes in taxes considered are those taken to reduce past budget deﬁcits.
As Romer and Romer (2007), we also ﬁnd that tax increases are contractionary, but
the magnitudes of our results are difﬁcult to compare to theirs. In our estimates, we
ﬁnd that a 1% increase in the cyclically adjusted tax revenue decreases real growth
by less than one-third of a percentage point. However, we estimate a very different
speciﬁcation and, contrary to Romer and Romer (2007), our approach also controls
for changes in government spending undertaken to reduce budget deﬁcits as well
as for changes in taxation.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use structurally VAR techniques to identify ex-
ogenous changes in ﬁscal policy and estimate ﬁscal multipliers both on the tax and
on the spending side of the government. They ﬁnd that positive government spend-
ing shocks increase output, consumption and decrease investment, while positive
tax shocks have a negative effect on output, consumption and investment. Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2008) use a very different identiﬁcation approach and, while they
also ﬁnd that both taxes and spending increases have a negative effect on private
investment (as previously shown by Alesina et al. (2002)), they show that spending
increases do not generate an increase in consumption and that deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax
cuts are the most effective way to stimulate the economy. The result of a positive
effect of government spending shocks on private consumption is also challenged
by Ramey (2008). She ﬁnds that, capturing the timing of the news about govern-
ment spending increases with a narrative approach and not with delay as in a VAR
approach, consumption declines after increases in government spending. Our re-
sults on the negative correlation between both spending and tax increases on GDP
5growth are clearly consistent with the results of these papers using quite different
methodological approaches than ours.
A substantial literature has investigated political and institutional effects on
ﬁscal policy and in particular on the propensity of different parties in different
institutional settings to prolong ﬁscal imbalances, or to reign them in promptly. On
delayed ﬁscal adjustments see Alesina and Drazen (1999), on politico institutional
effects, like the role of electoral laws, on the occurrence of loose or tight ﬁscal
policy see Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Milesi Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno
(2002). Alesina Perotti and Tavares (1998) using an approach similar to that of
the present paper and based upon "episodes", investigate which parties are more
or less likely to run in ﬁscal stimuli or ﬁscal adjustments. One criticism that one
could raise to the literature on voting rules and institutions on ﬁscal imbalances is
that rules are not exogenous and third factors may indeed explain both the adoption
of certain voting rule (like proportional representation) and ﬁscal policy, a point
discussed in Alesina and Glaeser(2004) informally and Aghion Alesina and Trebbi
(2007) more formally. We do not pursue in the present paper this politico economic
analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and the deﬁn-
ition of episode which we adopt. Section 3 presents basis statistics on the episodes
showing rather striking results. Section 4 shows some regression analysis, which
although it has no pretence of having solved causality problems reinforces the re-
sults obtained by the simple statistics of Section 3. The last section concludes.
2 Data, Methodology and deﬁnitions
2.1 Methodology
Our approach is very simple. We identify major changes in ﬁscal policy, either
expansionary (deﬁcit increases or surplus reductions) or the opposite. Obviously
the decision about whether to engage in this policy changes is endogenous to the
state of the economy and of the ﬁnances However we assume that at least up to a
point the decision of whether or not to act on the spending side or the revenue side
of the government is dictated by political preferences and political bargain which
is, at least to a point, exogenous to the economy and generated by ideological or
policy preferences. Looking at the debates proceeding major ﬁscal changes, and
considering the high degree of uncertainty about the size of ﬁscal multipliers this
assumption holds some water. Thus our only emphasis is on the effects of different
composition of ﬁscal stimuli and adjustments. We cannot and do not compute the
size of ﬁscal multipliers. We only compare the effects of different compositions of
major ﬁscal changes.
62.2 Data and Sources
We use a panel of OECD countries for a maximum time period from 1970 to 2007.
The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States. All ﬁscal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook Database no. 84.
Our approach identiﬁes episodes of large changes in the ﬁscal stance and stud-
ies the behavior of ﬁscal and macroeconomic variables around those episodes to
investigate whether different characteristics of ﬁscal packages are correlated with
different macroeconomic outcomes. More speciﬁcally, we focus both on the size
of the ﬁscal packages (i.e.: the magnitude of the change of the government deﬁcit)
and on its composition (i.e.: the percentage change of the main government budget
items relative to the total change) and we investigate whether large ﬁscal stimuli
and adjustments that differ in size and composition are associated with booms or
economic recessions (as deﬁned below) and whether governments that implement
different types of ﬁscal adjustments are successful / unsuccessful in reducing gov-
ernment debt.
We use a cyclically adjusted value of the ﬁscal variables to leave aside vari-
ations of the ﬁscal variables induced by business cycle ﬂuctuations. The cyclical
adjustment is based on the method proposed by Blanchard (1993). It is a simple
method and rather transparent, which corrects various component of the govern-
ment budget for year to year changes in the unemployment rate. More precisely,
the cyclically adjusted value of the change in a ﬁscal variable is the difference be-
tween a measure of the ﬁscal variable in period t computed as if the unemployment
rate were equal to the one in t −1 and the actual value of the ﬁscal variable in year
t − 1.3 We prefer this method to more complicated measures like those produced
by the OECD because the latter are a bit of a black box based upon many assump-
tions about ﬁscal multipliers upon which there is much uncertainty. Based on our
previous work (Alesina and Ardagna (1998)) we are conﬁdent that for the large
episodes which we consider the details of how to adjust for the cycle do not matter
much for the qualitative nature of the results. In fact, even not correcting at all
would give similar results.4
3To calculate the measure of the ﬁscal variable in period t as if the unemployment rate were
equal to the one in t − 1, we follow the procedure in Alesina and Perotti (1995). Speciﬁcally, for
e a c hc o u n t r yi nt h es a m p l e ,w er e g r e s st h eﬁscal policy variable as share of GDP, on a time trend
and on the unemployment rate. Then, using the coefﬁcients and the residuals from the estimated
regressions, we predict what the value of the ﬁscal variable as a share of GDP in period t would have
been if the unemployment rate were the same as in the previous year.
4More on this is available from the authors.
72.3 Deﬁnition of the episodes
To identify episodes of ﬁscal adjustments and ﬁscal stimuli we focus on large
changes of ﬁscal policy and use the following rule.
Deﬁnition 1 Fiscal adjustments and stimuli
Ap e r i o do fﬁscal adjustment (stimulus) is a year in which the cyclically ad-
justed primary balance improves (deteriorates) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP.
These are rather demanding criteria, which rule out small, but prolonged, ad-
justments/stimuli. We have chosen them because we are particularly interested in
episodes which are very sharp and large and clearly indicate a change in the ﬁs-
cal stance. This deﬁnition misses ﬁscal adjustments and stimuli which are small
in each year but prolonged for several years. It would be quite difﬁcult to come
up with a deﬁnition that captured the many possible pattern of multi years small
adjustments. Thus, the study of these episodes gives a clue on what happens with
sharp and brief changes in the ﬁscal stance.
We use the primary deﬁcit, (i.e.: the difference between current and capital
spending, excluding interest rate expenses paid on government debt, and total tax
revenue)5 rather than the total deﬁcit, to avoid that episodes selected result from the
effect that changes in interest rates have on total government expenditures. Using
thesecriteriawetrytofocus as muchaspossible onepisodes that donot result from
the automatic response of ﬁscal variables to economic growth or monetary pol-
icy induced changes on interest rates, but they should reﬂect discretionary policy
choices of ﬁscal authorities. Needless to say, there can still be an endogeneity issue
related to the occurrence of ﬁscal adjustments and expansions, because, in princi-
ple, discretionary policy choices of ﬁscal authorities can be affected by countries’
macroeconomic conditions. However, note that the budget for the current year is
approved during the second half of the previous year and, even though additional
measures can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective
with some delay, generally toward the end of the ﬁscal year.
Deﬁnition 1 selects 107 periods of ﬁscal adjustments (15.1% of the observa-
tions in our sample) and 91 periods of ﬁscal stimuli (12.9% of the observations
in our sample). Table A1 in appendix lists all of them. Of the 107 episodes of
ﬁscal adjustments, 65 last only for one period, while the rest are multiperiods ad-
justments. The majority of the latter (13) last for two consecutive years, 4 are
5See the appendix for a detail deﬁnition of each variable used in the empirical analysis.
8three years adjustments and the Denmark 1983-1986 ﬁscal stabilization is the only
episode lasting 4 consecutive years. As for ﬁscal stimuli, 52 episodes last one pe-
riod, in 12 cases the stimulus continues in the second year as well, and in 5 cases
deﬁnition 1 selects ﬁscal stimuli that last for 3 consecutive years.
We are interested in two outcomes of very tight and very loose ﬁscal poli-
cies: whether they are associated with an expansion in economic activity during
and in their immediate aftermath and whether they are associated with a reduc-
tion in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, an episode is deﬁned expansionary
a c c o r d i n gt od e ﬁnition 2 and successful according to deﬁnition 3; we deﬁne con-
tractionary/unsuccessful all the episodes of ﬁscal stimuli and adjustments that are
not expansionary/successful according to these deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 Expansionary ﬁscal adjustments and ﬁscal stimuli
An episode of ﬁscal adjustment (ﬁscal stimulus) is expansionary if the average
growth rateof GDP, in differencefrom the G7 average(weightedby GDP weights),
in the ﬁrst period of the episode and in the two years after is greater than the
value of 75th percentile of the same variable empirical density in all episodes of
ﬁscal adjustments (ﬁscal stimuli). This deﬁnitions selects 26 years of expansionary
periods during ﬁscal adjustments (3.7% of the observations of the entire OECD
sample) and 20 years of expansionary periods during ﬁscal stimuli (2.8% of the
observations of the entire OECD sample). See table A2 for a list.
Deﬁnition 3 Successful ﬁscal adjustments
Ap e r i o do fﬁscal adjustment is successful if the cumulative reduction of the
debt to GDP ratio three years after the beginning of a ﬁscal adjustment is greater
than4.5percentagepoints(thevalueof25thpercentileofthechangeofthedebt-to-
GDP ratio empirical density in all episodes of ﬁscal adjustments).6 This deﬁnitions
selects 17 periods of successful ﬁscal adjustments (2.7% of the observations of the
entire OECD sample). In Table A3 in Appendix we list all the episodes.
We have experimented with variation of the threshold of these deﬁnitions but
the results are robust, that is they do not change signiﬁcantly as result of small
6If an episode of tight ﬁscal policy takes place in 2005, the cumulative change of the debt-to-
GDP ratio is computed over a two years horizon, not to loose too many observations at the end of
the sample. If the episode occurs after 2005, we cannot determine whether it is a successful or an
unsuccessful one.
9changes of the deﬁnitions. A value of 1.5 change in deﬁcits in a year is sufﬁ-
ciently high to eliminate years of "business as usual" in which ﬂuctuations of the
deﬁcits may just be only cyclical. However it is not so large as to have very few
data points. Also, our “horizon” for the deﬁnition of “expansionary” and “success”
is relatively short. Choosing a longer horizon has two problems. First, one looses
many observations at the end of the sample; second, and more importantly, choos-
ing a longer horizon makes the connection between the episodes and economic
outcomes several years later more tenuous, given the extent of intervening factors.
Finally, note that according to deﬁnition 2 and 3, multiyears ﬁscal adjustments and
stimuli are considered as a "single" episode because the length of the time horizon
chosen for the deﬁnition of “expansionary” and “success” starts from the ﬁrst year
of the episode. Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998),
instead, consider each year of a multiyear period as a single episode. This implies
that, in a multiyear episode, some years can be expansionary, some contractionary,
some can be successful, some unsuccessful. While we have no reason to prefer one
choice over the other, we ﬁnd reassuring that results are robust to these alternative




Let’s begin by analyzing what happens with ﬁscal stimuli, namely whether we can
detect differences in the effects of ﬁscal packages depending on their composition
on the economy. Table 1 shows the composition in terms of spending components
and revenue components of the 20 years of expansionary ﬁscal stimulus packages
versus the others. In Tables 1-6, the period [T − 2,T − 1] is the two year period
preceding the ﬁrst year of a ﬁscal stimulus/adjustment. The period [T]i st h eﬁrst
year and the period [T + 1,T + 2] is the two year period following the beginning
of an episode.8 All the variables in the tables are yearly averages.
The most striking result of this table is that in expansionary episodes total
spending increases by roughly 1 per cent of GDP while revenues fall by more
than 2.5 per cent of GDP. In contractionary episodes total spending goes up by
7More details on these sensitivity analysis are available from the authors.
8The Denmark ﬁscal contraction is the only episode lasting 4 years. We have included the values
of the variables in 1986 in the column [T + 1,T + 2]. We checked and conﬁrm that the qualitative
nature of the results does not change if the period [T] inlcudes all the years of a tight/expansionary
episode of ﬁscal policy and the period [T + 1,T + 2] is the two year period following the last year
of an episode.
10close to 3 per cent of GDP while revenues are roughly constant in terms of GDP.
This correlation seems to suggest that stimulus packages used upon the spending
side do not work or at least not as well as those based upon spending increases.
In terms of components of spending we note that there is no difference between
expansionary and contractionary episodes regarding public investment which goes
up by roughly the same amount in ratios of GDP. All the other components of
primary spending and, in particular transfers, go up much more in contractionary
episodes. This suggests that the non public investment components of the bud-
get are those which explain the different correlation with growth. As for revenues
note the large cut in income taxes in expansionary stimuli and the slight increase
in contractionary ones. Not surprisingly the debt over GDP ratio goes up less in
expansionary episodes since the denominator increases more.
Figure 1 offers a striking visual image of the different compositions in terms
of revenues and spending of expansionary and contractionary episodes. The ﬁrst
two comparison of total spending and revenues are rather striking even visually.
In Table 2 we look at the different components of GDP to check whether there
are difference in composition between expansionary and contractionary episodes.
The ﬁrst two lines which refer to GDP growth are somewhat obvious since they
reﬂect the selection criteria of these episodes. All the components of aggregate
demand grow more after the stimulus in expansionary episodes. This result is a
bit different than that reported in Alesina and Ardagna (1998). In that sample the
difference between the two types of episodes seemed concentrated on investment
rather than consumption.9 In this sample both consumption and investment behave
differently, both increasing in expansionary cases and declining in contractionary
ones. This table also allows us to check whether the state of the economy before
the adjustments was different in the two groups. In terms of domestic growth and
relative to G7 average, expansionary episodes occurred when growth was higher.
As for the other components the only signiﬁcant difference seem to be in the trade
balance. It is obviously cavalier to draw broad conclusions from this but enormous
differences in the preexisting state of the economy do not jump out from this table.
3.2 Fiscal adjustments
Fiscal adjustments can be judged in two ways, as discussed above. One is about
whether they have been successful in signiﬁcantly reducing deﬁcits and the debt
over GDP ratios and second whether they have been associated with a reduction
in growth or not. Obviously, the two criteria are correlated since a growth en-
hancing adjustment is more likely to be successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP
9See Also Alesina, Ardagna Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) for related work on the effect of
ﬁscal policy on investment.
11ratio. However, the correlation is not perfect since a ﬁscal adjustment may lead to
a sharp reduction of the debt/GDP ratio because the numerator drops faster than
the denominator. Episodes with this characteristic, that is the ability to reduce the
debt-to-GDP ratio exist, for example Netherlands in 1993, Norway in 1989, and
Sweden in 1986-1987.
Table 3 is organized in the same way as Table 1 above. The expansionary
episodes of ﬁscal adjustments are mostly characterized by spending cuts. Primary
spending as a percent of GDP falls by more than 2 per cent. Total revenues in-
stead increase slightly by about 0.34 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, in the
case of contractionary ﬁscal adjustments primary spending is cut by about 0.7 per
cent of GDP, while revenues increase by about 1.2 per cent of GDP. Thus, ﬁscal
adjustments occurring on the spending side have superior effects on growth than
those based upon increases in tax revenues. As far as the composition in compo-
nents probably the most striking difference between the two types of adjustments
has to do with the role of transfers. In contractionary cases transfers continue to
growth as a percentage of GDP of almost half of a percentage point. In expansion-
ary episodes, instead, transfers fall by roughly the same amount. Thus, in between
the two types of episodes there is a very large difference of 1 per cent of GDP in the
share of transfers. Looking at the composition of revenues one is struck by income
taxes: they go down quite signiﬁcantly in expansionary adjustments and go up in
contractionary ones. The difference between the two is almost 1 percentage point
of GDP. This difference is by far the largest among revenue components.
Figure 2 is organized in the same way as ﬁgure 1 and even in this case visually
the contrast between the two types of ﬁscal adjustments is quite obvious. When
we look at the different components of GDP, we ﬁnd that both consumption and
investment grow more during expansionary episodes. We did not uncover any re-
markable composition effects, along the same line a Table 2 displayed for ﬁscal
stimuli. These sample statistics are reported in Table 4 which is organized as Ta-
ble 2. The other interesting observation is that at least in terms of GDP growth
and growth of its components the preexisting conditions of expansionary and con-
tractionary episodes look remarkably similar. One rather remarkable observation
comes from comparing the growth performance during expansionary stimuli and
expansionary adjustments: they are quite similar!
Let’s now consider successful versus unsuccessful adjustments as shown in
Table 5. The comparison between the two is especially striking. In successful
episodes total primary spending as a percentage of GDP falls by about 2 per cent
of GDP. Total revenues actually decline of about half of percentage point of GDP.
Thus, successful ﬁscal adjustments are completely based on spending cuts accom-
panied by modest tax cuts! On the contrary, in unsuccessful adjustments total
revenue goes up by almost 1.5 per cent of GDP and primary spending are cut by
12about 0.8 of GDP. Once again this comparison points in the direction of spending
cuts as the more successful ways of ﬁxing budget problems.
Regarding the composition of spending and revenue the most striking com-
parison is given by the transfers item. In successful adjustments transfers fall by
0.83 per cent of GDP, while in unsuccessful adjustments they grow at about 0.4
per cent, a huge difference between the two episodes of 1.2 percent of GDP. This
comparison points in a clear direction: it is very difﬁcult if not impossible to ﬁx
public ﬁnances when in trouble without solving the question of automatic increases
in entitlements. Regarding the composition of revenues, again as above the most
striking difference is on income taxes. Figure 3, once again, gives a striking visual
image of these results.
4 Some regressions
In this section we present some simple regressions on GDP growth as a function
of changes of ﬁscal policy in the recent past. We should put up-front the fact that
causality issues are all over the place here and we do not claim to have solved them.
These regressions should be viewed as correlations, but we ﬁnd them instructive
and the message which they send is on the same line of that emerging from our
descriptive analysis above.
Let’s begin with ﬁscal stimuli. In Table 7, columns 1-4, we regress real GDP
growth in a year of ﬁscal stimulus on its one period and two period lagged values,
on the lagged value of the weighted average of the real GDP growth of the G7
countries, on the lagged value of the ratio of public debt to GDP ratio and on a
set of ﬁscal policy variables measuring the size and the composition of the ﬁscal
stimulus. Columns 5-8 are analogous to the previous 4 columns except for the lhs
variable, now equal to the average of real GDP growth in a year of ﬁscal stimulus
a n di nt h et w of o l l o w i n go n e s .
We ﬁnd that, controlling for initial conditions, a one percentage point higher
increase in the current spending to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.75 percentage
point lower growth. The effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Instead,
larger increases in spending on capital goods or larger cuts in taxes do not have sta-
tistically signiﬁcant effects on growth (see column 2). When we try to investigate
whether the size of the ﬁscal stimulus or its composition is relevant for economic
growth, we ﬁnd more evidence in favor of the composition. We measure the size of
the ﬁscal stimulus with the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. We
measure the composition of ﬁscal stimuli with two different variables: (i) the ratio
between the change in current spending to GDP ratio and the change in the primary
balance (columns 3 and 7), and (ii) the sum of the change in current spending and
13tax revenue to GDP ratios (column 4 and 8) to account for the fact that both current
spending increases and tax increases can be negatively associated with growth.
Both measures of composition are statistically signiﬁc a n ta tt h e5 %l e v e li na l l
speciﬁcations. In column 3, the sign of the ratio between the change in current
spending to GDP ratio and the change in the primary balance indicates that the
larger the share of the worsening in the primary balance due to spending increases
the lower GDP growth. On average, during years of ﬁscal stimuli about 54% of
the deterioration in the primary balance is due to increases in current spending
items. A one standard deviation increase in this variable (equal to 51%, undoubt-
edly a very large number) would reduce growth by 1 percentage point. Finally, a
larger increase in the primary deﬁc i tt oG D Pr a t i oi sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hl o w e rg r o w t h ,
however, the effect is statistically signiﬁcant only in column 3.
Table 8 is very similar to Table 7 but we replace the change in current spend-
ing and taxes with their respective components. Consistent with the evidence in
Table 7, our regressions show that ﬁscal stimuli more heavily based on increases in
current spending items (government wage and non-wage components, subsidies)
are associated with lower growth, while ﬁscal stimulus packages based on cuts in
income, business and indirect taxes are more likely to be expansionary.
When we turn to the sample of ﬁscal adjustments (Tables 9 and 10), our results
still point in the same direction: namely, the composition of the ﬁscal adjustment,
more than its size, matters for growth and ﬁscal adjustments associated with higher
GDP growth are those in which a larger share of the reduction of the primary
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is due to cuts in current spending, to the government wage
and non-wage components, and to subsidies. All this evidence is consistent with
the previous literature on ﬁscal stabilizations and is robust if we introduce among
the regressors the change in the short-term interest rate as a control for the stance
of monetary policy or the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate to control
for exchange rate devaluations that can occur at the same time of large changes in
the ﬁscal stance (results are not shown but are available upon request).
Finally, wehaveestimatedthesamespeciﬁcationsasinTables7and9, columns
1, 2, and 4 for the entire sample of OECD data that, hence, includes episodes of
ﬁscal adjustments, stimuli and years in which the cyclically adjusted primary bal-
ance changes between -1.5% and 1.5%. We have also checked whether there are
non-linearities associated with times of large ﬁscal adjustments and stimuli. Table
11 shows the results.10 Results are in line with the evidence shown so far: we
ﬁnd that larger reductions in current spending and in taxation are associated with
higher GDP growth, while changes in capital spending do not show any signiﬁcant
effect on growth. Moreover, the speciﬁcations in columns 4-9, do not support any
10Regressions in Table 11 include country and year dummies among the rhs variables.
14evidence of non-linearities in episodes of ﬁscal adjustments or stimuli. Both the
coefﬁcients of the dummy variables Tightand Loose and the coefﬁcients between
the interaction terms of these variables and the ﬁscal policy indicators are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. As suggested by Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli
(2002), there seems to be nothing special around such episodes that can explain the
behavior of growth relatively to normal times.
5 Conclusions
Rather than reviewing again our result it is worth elaborating, or perhaps speculat-
ing on the current and future ﬁscal stance in the US. As we well know a very large
portion of the current astronomical 12 percent of GDP deﬁcit is the result of bailout
of various types of the ﬁnancial sector. This is an issue on which this paper has
nothing to say. But part of the deﬁcit is the result of the stimulus package that was
passed to lift the economy out of the recession. About two third of this ﬁscal pack-
age is constituted by increases in spending, including public investment, transfers
and government consumption. According to our results ﬁscal stimuli based upon
tax cut are much more likely to be growth enhancing than those on the spending
side. Needless to say when considering a single episode many other factors jump
to mind, factors which are difﬁcult to capture in a multi country regressions. For
instance, American families were saving too little before the crisis. An income
tax cut might have just simply been saved and might have had not a big impact on
aggregate consumption. However, more saving might have reinforced the ﬁnan-
cial sector, think of the credit card crisis for instance. In addition, one could have
though of tax cuts that stimulate investment. The beneﬁt of infrastructure projects
which have "long and variable lags" is much more questionable.
After the "perfect storm" of this current crisis the US will emerge with an
unprecedented (for peace time) increase in government debt. As we argued in the
introduction it is unlikely that these deﬁcits and debt will disappear simply because
growth will resume at very rapid pace very soon. Primary suppresses would be
needed since interest rates cannot go other than up from the close to zero actual
levels. The analysis of the present paper suggests that unless primary spending is
cut, it is difﬁcult to acheive ﬁscal stability because spending may rise faster than
tax revenue. But what can be cut? Hopefully improvements in the peace process in
Afghanistan and Iraq might allow a reduction of military expenditure, but given the
instability in theregion onecannot count onthat forsure. Health carereforms seem
to imply large increases in spending, the retirement of the baby boomers is not too
far, and in the pressing time of the crisis the issue of Social Security has been in
the background, but it has not disappeared A relatively high unemployment for a
15couple of more years will require spending on subsidies. The budget outlook looks
rather grim on the spending side. The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce predicts deﬁcit
of 7 per cent of GDP up to 2020. This is not a rosy scenario.
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186 Data Appendix
• Debt.= government gross debt as a share of GDP
• Total deﬁcit = cyclically adjusted total deﬁcit as a share of GDP = primary
deﬁcit + (interest expenses on government debt/GDP)
• Primary deﬁcit = cyclically adjusted primary deﬁcit as a share of GDP =
Primary expenses - Total revenue
• Primary expenses = cyclically adjusted primary expenditure as a share of
GDP = Transfers + ((Government wage expenditures + Government non
wage expenditures + Subsidies + Government investment)/GDP)
• Curr. G = cyclically adjusted current expenditure as a share of GDP = Trans-
fers + ((Government wage expenditures + Government non wage expendi-
tures + Subsidies)/GDP)
• Transfers = cyclically adjusted transfers as a share of GDP
• Government wage expenditures = government wage bill expenditures
• Government non wage expenditures = government non wage bill expendi-
tures
• Subsidies = subsidies to ﬁrms
• Government investment = gross government consumption on ﬁxed capital
• Total revenue = Tax = cyclically adjusted total revenue as a share of GDP =
Income taxes + Business taxes + Indirect taxes + Social security contribu-
tions + (Other taxes/GDP)
• Income taxes = cyclically adjusted income taxes as a share of GDP = cycli-
cally adjusted direct taxes on household as a share of GDP
• Business taxes = cyclically adjusted business taxes as a share of GDP =
cyclically adjusted direct taxes on businesses as a share of GDP
• Indirect taxes = cyclically adjusted indirect taxes as a share of GDP = cycli-
cally adjusted indirect taxes as a share of GDP
• Social security contributions = cyclically adjusted social security contribu-
tions paid by employers and employees as a share of GDP
19•  Curr.G/ Pr.Deﬁcit;  Gov.Inv/ Pr.Deﬁcit;  Spending item/ Pr.Deﬁcit;
= an increase in these variables means that a larger share of the increase
(reduction) of the primary deﬁcit is obtained by increasing (cutting) current
spending/gov. investment/spending item
•  Tax Revenue Item/ Pr.Deﬁcit = an increase in these variables means that
a larger share of the increase (reduction) of the primary deﬁcit is obtained by
cutting (increasing) a revenue item of the government budget
•  Curr.G+ Tax is actually equal to the negative of this variable. If both
taxes and spending are cut during the episode of loose or tight ﬁscal policy,
the variable has the “highest positive” value. If, instead, both spending and
taxes increase the variable has the “highest negative value”.
• G7 GDP Growth = average growth rate of real GDP (with GDP weights) of
the seven major industrial countries
• GDP Growth = growth rate of real capita GDP
• Trade Balance = Trade balance as a share of GDP = (Exports of goods and











































Expansionary episodes Contractionary episodes
Note: Figure 1 shows the percentage of the  increase  (reduction) in  the primary deficit  (surplus) due  to changes in  spending and revenue items of the  government budget. Positive values indicate  that 
expenditure items  increase  and revenue  items decrease, contributing to a worsening of the primary balance. Negative values indicate that  expenditure items decrease  and revenue items increase, 
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Expansionary episodes Contractionary episodes
Note: Figure 2 shows the percentage of the  decrease (increase) in  the primary deficit  (surplus) due to  changes in  spending and revenue items of the  government budget. Positive values indicate  that 
expenditure items  decrease and revenue  items increase, contributing to an improvement of the primary balance. Negative values indicate that  expenditure items increase and revenue items decrease, 
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Successful episodes Unsuccessful episodes
Note: Figure 3 shows the percentage of the  decrease (increase) in  the primary deficit  (surplus) due to  changes in  spending and revenue items of the  government budget. Positive values indicate  that 
expenditure items  decrease and revenue  items increase, contributing to an improvement of the primary balance. Negative values indicate that  expenditure items increase and revenue items decrease, 
contributing to a worsening of the  primary balance(0 33) (0 32) (0 37) (0 13) (0 14) (0 15)
Table 1: Fiscal stimuli: size and composition
Expansionary Contractionary
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Debt 50.28 50.52 51.1 0.82 60.79 62.38 63.3 2.51
(9.03) (9.09) (9.48) (5.18) (5.18) (4.46)
Change in debt -1.02 0.48 0.53 1.55 -0.29 2.24 2.21 2.50
(1.47) (1.12) (1.24) (0.59) (0.67) (0.68)
Total deficit -1.04 2.19 3.27 4.31 1.5 3.79 3.97 2.47
(1.62) (1.65) (1.24) (0.72) (0.74) (0.71)
Primary deficit -2.01 1.16 1.61 3.62 -0.3 1.99 2.13 2.43
(0.82) (0.92) (0.91) (0.45) (0.48) (0.41)
Primary expenditures 36.79 37.72 37.84 1.05 40.08 42.22 42.92 2.84
(1.73) (1.64) (1.66) (0.94) (0.94) (1.00)
Transfers 14.93 14.88 15.11 0.18 16.83 17.28 18.05 1.22
(1.03) (1.01) (1.04) (0.60) (0.58) (0.57)
Government wage expenditures 10.62 10.74 10.94 0.32 11.78 12.2 12.58 0.80
(0.52) (0.47) (0.50) (0.41) (0.43) (0.46)
Government non wage expenditures 6.81 6.96 6.97 0.16 7.73 8.15 8.18 0.45
(0.49) (0.49) (0.55) (0.29) (0.28) (0.31)
Subsidies 2.03 2.09 2.24 0.21 1.82 1.93 1.93 0.11
(0.33) (0 32) . . (0 37) (0 13) . (0 14) (0 15) . .
Government investment 2.26 3.05 2.58 0.32 1.95 2.67 2.21 0.26
(0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.19) (0.27) (0.21)
Total revenue 38.8 36.56 36.23 -2.57 40.38 40.23 40.8 0.42
(1.90) (1.83) (2.00) (1.15) (1.12) (1.07)
Income taxes 10.89 9.2 9.03 -1.86 11.02 11.21 11.26 0.24
(1.10) (0.98) (1.08) (0.74) (0.71) (0.67)
Business taxes 4.25 3.37 2.6 -1.65 3.03 2.78 2.74 -0.29
(0.83) (0.63) (0.33) (0.25) (0.20) (0.22)
Indirect taxes 13.33 12.57 12.6 -0.73 12.67 12.5 12.76 0.09
(0.61) (0.61) (0.69) (0.39) (0.40) (0.36)
Social security contributions 8.7 8.93 9.35 0.65 11.08 11.17 11.36 0.28
(0.94) (0.82) (0.89) (0.69) (0.68) (0.70)
Source: OECD.  Variables are in share of GDP. Total deficit, Primary deficit, Primary expenditures, Transfers, Total revenues, and all revenue items are cyclically adjusted variables. 
Standard deviations of the means in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variablesTable 2: Fiscal stimuli and growth
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
G7 GDP Growth 0.39 1.6 2.03 1.64 0.2 -0.7 -0.74 -0.94
(0.66) (0.53) (0.32) (0.23) (0.23) (0.19)
GDP Growth 3.9 3.77 4.37 0.47 2.89 0.93 1.79 -1.1
(0.65) (0.35) (0.32) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27)
Private Consumption Growth 3.49 3.47 3.72 0.23 3.08 1.54 1.86 -1.22
(0.7) (0.61) (0.32) (0.22) (0.3) (0.29)
Total Investment Growth 3.44 2.58 6.55 3.11 2.9 -1.39 0.04 -2.86
(1.81) (1.63) (1.00) (0.59) (0.82) (0.64)
Private Investment Growth 3.5 1.14 7.49 3.99 3.36 -1.9 0.07 -3.29
(2.05) (2.04) (1.25) (0.73) (1.02) (0.82)
Business Investment Growth 5.51 2.5 7.64 2.13 6.73 -0.34 -0.78 -7.51
(2.06) (3.21) (1.53) (1.44) (1.34) (1.07)
Trade Balance 0.53 0.61 -1.9 -2.43 0.19 -0.2 0.14 -0.05
(2.07) (2.2) (2.11) (0.7) (0.65) (0.69)
Expansionary Contractionary(0 33) (0 30) (0 28) (0 13) (0 13) (0 14)
Table 3: Expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustments: size and composition
Expansionary Contractionary
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Debt 59.86 57.53 54.1 -5.76 69.15 71.8 69.52 0.37
(5.52) (5.22) (5.07) (4.04) (4.23) (4.25)
Change in debt -1.46 -2.42 -2.3 -0.84 3.28 1.97 1.28 -2.00
(1.03) (1.14) (0.54) (0.62) (0.54) (0.52)
Total deficit 3.61 1.33 0.56 -3.05 5.67 3.89 4.14 -1.53
(1.09) (1.18) (0.98) (0.63) (0.70) (0.72)
Primary deficit 1.31 -0.84 -1.23 -2.54 2.7 0.74 0.85 -1.85
(0.77) (0.74) (0.60) (0.40) (0.43) (0.39)
Primary expenditures 41.32 39.71 39.13 -2.19 43.22 42.47 42.58 -0.64
(2.04) (1.80) (1.59) (0.98) (0.95) (0.93)
Transfers 18.1 17.66 17.52 -0.58 17.95 18.21 18.42 0.47
(1.37) (1.21) (1.08) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
Government wage expenditures 11.65 11.41 11.25 -0.40 12.46 12.25 12.16 -0.30
(0.53) (0.51) (0.46) (0.40) (0.38) (0.36)
Government non wage expenditures 7.03 6.91 6.9 -0.13 8.09 8.1 8.11 0.02
(0.53) (0.49) (0.48) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Subsidies 2.17 1.95 1.85 -0.32 2.07 1.98 1.98 -0.09
(0.33) . (0 30) . (0 28) (0 13) . (0 13) (0 14) . .
Government investment 2.38 1.77 1.61 -0.77 2.66 1.95 1.96 -0.70
(0.29) (0.27) (0.25) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14)
Total revenue 40.02 40.56 40.36 0.34 40.52 41.73 41.73 1.21
(1.99) (1.90) (1.84) (0.98) (0.94) (0.96)
Income taxes 10.62 10.59 10.35 -0.27 11.45 11.79 11.93 0.48
(1.04) (1.07) (0.97) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63)
Business taxes 2.92 3.49 3.58 0.66 2.55 2.88 2.9 0.35
(0.41) (0.51) (0.50) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25)
Indirect taxes 13.52 13.61 13.53 0.01 12.44 12.69 12.65 0.21
(0.46) (0.40) (0.40) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30)
Social security contributions 9.63 9.52 9.56 -0.07 11.44 11.52 11.38 -0.06
(1.01) (0.92) (0.89) (0.61) (0.62) (0.66)
Source: OECD.  Variables are in share of GDP. Total deficit, Primary deficit, Primary expenditures, Transfers, Total revenues, and all revenue items are cyclically adjusted variables. 
Standard deviations of the means in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variablesTable 4: Expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustments and growth
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
G7 GDP Growth 0.57 1.49 1.98 1.41 -0.32 -0.42 -0.49 -0.17
(0.55) (0.37) (0.24) (0.2) (0.2) (0.17)
GDP Growth 3.14 4.73 4.68 1.54 2.03 2.36 2.25 0.22
(0.56) (0.39) (0.33) (0.2) (0.18) (0.18)
Private Consumption Growth 2.82 4.12 4.34 1.52 1.94 2.27 2.27 0.33
(0.49) (0.47) (0.42) (0.26) (0.24) (0.19)
Total Investment Growth 1.44 7.72 7.91 6.47 1 1.91 2.5 1.5
(1.68) (0.98) (1.12) (0.61) (0.54) (0.72)
Private Investment Growth 1.41 9.6 7.81 6.4 1.04 2.92 3.15 2.11
(1.86) (1.22) (1.33) (0.75) (0.69) (0.89)
Business Investment Growth 2.23 10.88 4.98 2.75 2.97 3.23 5.17 2.2
(1.9) (1.76) (2.62) (1) (1.18) (1)
Trade Balance 0.71 1.85 1.56 0.85 -0.54 0.15 0.95 1.49
(1.58) (1.61) (1.81) (0.58) (0.64) (0.65)
Expansionary Contractionary(0 36) (0 35) (0 34) (0 14) (0 14) (0 15)
Table 5: Successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments: size and composition
Successful Unsuccessful
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Debt 61.92 59.63 53.18 -8.74 68.29 71.4 72.06 3.77
(4.32) (4.50) (4.16) (4.32) (4.53) (4.48)
Change in debt -1.6 -1.97 -3.88 -2.28 3.68 2.29 2.14 -1.54
(0.72) (1.14) (0.34) (0.64) (0.53) (0.43)
Total deficit 2.5 0.29 0.66 -1.84 5.6 3.77 3.69 -1.91
(1.00) (1.06) (1.09) (0.71) (0.83) (0.85)
Primary deficit 0.8 -1.2 -0.64 -1.44 2.7 0.71 0.57 -2.13
(0.68) (0.64) (0.69) (0.45) (0.51) (0.46)
Primary expenditures 45.78 43.67 43.83 -1.95 43.46 42.68 42.74 -0.72
(1.76) (1.60) (1.46) (1.10) (1.10) (1.03)
Transfers 19.86 19.07 19.03 -0.83 18.38 18.59 18.81 0.43
(1.11) (0.94) (0.89) (0.63) (0.64) (0.61)
Government wage expenditures 12.82 12.5 12.3 -0.52 12.51 12.3 12.19 -0.32
(0.69) (0.67) (0.63) (0.44) (0.42) (0.40)
Government non wage expenditures 8.73 8.62 8.71 -0.02 7.96 8.01 8 0.04
(0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Subsidies 2.29 2.14 2.05 -0.24 2.05 1.94 1.93 -0.12
(0.36) . (0 35) . (0 34) (0 14) . (0 14) (0 15) . .
Government investment 2.12 1.34 1.74 -0.38 2.57 1.85 1.81 -0.76
(0.38) (0.34) (0.27) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16)
Total revenue 44.98 44.86 44.47 -0.51 40.76 41.97 42.17 1.41
(1.61) (1.57) (1.67) (1.04) (1.04) (1.03)
Income taxes 13.69 13.43 13 -0.69 11.02 11.35 11.55 0.53
(1.18) (1.17) (1.16) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
Business taxes 2.77 3.37 3.59 0.82 2.69 3.08 3.1 0.41
(0.26) (0.31) (0.35) (0.22) (0.28) (0.31)
Indirect taxes 13.77 13.6 13.46 -0.31 12.32 12.51 12.63 0.31
(0.68) (0.61) (0.62) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Social security contributions 10.82 10.73 10.73 -0.09 12.04 12.25 12.15 0.11
(1.26) (1.15) (1.20) (0.62) (0.62) (0.64)
Source: OECD.  Variables are in share of GDP. Total deficit, Primary deficit, Primary expenditures, Transfers, Total revenues, and all revenue items are cyclically adjusted variables. 
Standard deviations of the means in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variablesTable 6: Successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments and growth
[T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a) [T-2 - T-1] T [T+1 - T+2] (c) - (a)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
G7 GDP Growth 0.4 0.8 0.85 0.45 -0.18 -0.22 -0.12 0.06
(0.53) (0.46) (0.37) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18)
GDP Growth 2.99 3.61 3.45 0.46 2.07 2.56 2.52 0.45
(0.58) (0.5) (0.28) (0.25) (0.2) (0.21)
Private Consumption Growth 2.75 3.74 3.02 0.27 2.01 2.28 2.42 0.41
(0.6) (0.67) (0.3) (0.26) (0.23) (0.2)
Total Investment Growth 2.95 4.11 4.78 1.83 1.02 2.55 3.52 2.5
(1.37) (1.54) (1.24) (0.69) (0.56) (0.73)
Private Investment Growth 3.45 5.6 5.07 1.62 1.18 3.43 4.23 3.05
(1.46) (1.85) (1.43) (0.81) (0.73) (0.9)
Business Investment Growth 3.2 5.46 6.06 2.86 3.23 5.17 5.84 2.61
(1.79) (2.06) (1.42) (1.07) (0.97) (1.08)
Trade Balance 2.72 3.99 4.31 1.59 -0.19 0.48 1.15 1.34
(1.1) (1.03) (1.51) (0.71) (0.77) (0.84)
Successful Unsuccessful51) 29) 57) 68) 30) 64)
Table 7: GDP growth during and in the aftermath of a fiscal stimulus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr.
GDP growth (-1) 0.467*** 0.484*** 0.51***7 0.48*** 0.217* 0.236** 0.266** 0.237**
(3.18) (3.62) (3.76) (3.66) (1.84) (2.15) (2.40) (2.17)
GDP growth (-2) -0.16 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.028
(-1.16) (-0.60) (-0.78) (-0.68) (-0.74) (-0.19) (-0.39) (-0.27)
G7 GDP growth (-1) 0.36* 0.27 0.25 0.27 -0.164 -0.23 -0.244 -0.228
(1.80) (1.47) (1.34) (1.49) (-1.03) (-1.53) (-1.61) (-1.53)
Debt (-1) -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.0068 -0.003 -0.006 -0.0061 -0.005
(-0.54) (-0.90) (-1.10) (-0.93) (-0.37) (-0.78) (-0.74) (-0.77)
Δ Curr. G -0.75*** -0.44**
(-2.87) (-2.02)
Δ Gov. Inv -0.256 -0.076
(-1.38) (-0.50)
Δ Tax -0.177 -0.199
(-0.62) (-0.85)
Δ Pr. Deficit -0.283 -0.428** -0.264 -0.102 -0.197 -0.089
(-1.51) (-1. (-2.29) (-2. (-1.57) (-0.68) (-1. (-0. (-1.30) (-0.64) (-1. (-0.
Δ Curr. G/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.02*** -0.016***
(-3.43) (-3.37)
Δ Gov. Inv/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.003 -0.005
(-0.39) (-0.73)
Δ Curr. G + Δ Tax 0.466*** 0.323***
(4.07) (3.44)
Constant 0.008 0.012 0.026*** 0.012 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.026***
(0.90) (1.38) (2.66) (1.45) (3.13) (3.52) (4.57) (3.78)
Observations 72 72 72 72 69 69 69 69
R-squared 0.28 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.21
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: real GDP growth rate during the fiscal stimulus in columns 1-4; average real GDP growth rate during the fiscal stimulus and in the following two years
in columns 5-8. T-statistics in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variables.Table 8: GDP growth and the composition of a fiscal stimulus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr.
GDP growth (-1) 0.36** 0.53** 0.48*** 0.26** 0.38*** 0.25**
(2.61) (3.81) (3.29) (2.25) (3.41) (2.11)
GDP growth (-2) 0.05 -0.09 -0.23 0.046 -0.08 -0.11
(0.42) (-0.71) (-1.64) (0.41) (-0.81) (-0.94)
G7 GDP growth (-1) 0.14 0.08 0.26 -0.343** -0.357** -0.27
(0.78) (0.44) (1.29) (-2.28) (-2.42) (-1.64)
Debt (-1) -0.0127* -0.01 -0.0003 -0.008 -0.0004 -0.0017
(-1.69) (-1.41) (-0.04) (-1.08) (-0.05) (-0.22)
Δ Tran -0.23 -0.345
(-0.50) (-0.87)
Δ Gov. non wage exp. -3.10*** -3.01***
(-3.57) (-4.06)
Δ Gov. wage exp. -1.32** -0.034
(-2.43) (-0.07)
Δ Subsidies -1.50 -0.623
(-1.49) (-0.73)
Δ Gov. Inv -0.22 -0.059
(-1.35) (-0.42)
Δ Income taxes 0.12 -0.281
(0.30) (-0.85)
Δ Bus. taxes -0.23 -0.121
(-0.73) (-0.45)
Δ Soc. security contr. 0.248 0.186
(0.56) (0.50)
Δ Indirect taxes -0.181 -0.167
(-0.37) () (-0.40) ()
Δ other taxes -3.001*** -2.022**
(-2.80) (-2.24)
Δ Pr. Deficit -0.493*** -0.32* -0.276* -0.077
(-2.76) (-1.80) (-1.93) (-0.53)
Δ Tran/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.002 -0.007
(0.26) (-1.06)
Δ Gov. non wage exp./Δ Pr. Deficit -0.053*** -0.065***
(-3.05) (-4.72)
Δ Gov. wage exp/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.032** 0.0019
(-2.07) (0.16)
Δ Subsidies/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.062** -0.04*
(-2.14) (-1.75)
Δ Gov. Inv/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.0016 -0.007
(-0.20) (-1.10)
Δ Income taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.016* 0.015**
(1.93) (2.29)
Δ Bus. taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.029*** 0.017*
(2.83) (1.88)
Δ Soc. security contr./Δ Pr. Deficit 0.01 0.008
(0.99) (1.00)
Δ Indirect taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.030** 0.023**
(2.50) (2.42)
Δ other taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.032** 0.014
(2.48) (1.34)
Constant 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.006 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.019***
(3.12) (3.65) (0.70) (4.72) (5.28) (2.73)
Observations 67 69 70 64 66 67
R-squared 0.63 0.51 0.43 0.47 0.39 0.21
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: real GDP growth rate during the fiscal stimulus in columns 1-3; average real GDP growth
 rate during the fiscal stimulus and in the following two years in columns 4-6. T-statistics in parenthesis.
S h A di f h d fi i i f h i bl  See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variables.Δ G/Δ fi 0 017*** 0 015***
Table 9: GDP growth during and in the aftermath of a fiscal adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr.
GDP growth (-1) 0.296*** 0.288*** 0.269*** 0.30*** 0.198** 0.197** 0.182** 0.202***
(2.99) (3.12) (3.04) (3.29) (2.41) (2.56) (2.48) (2.66)
GDP growth (-2) -0.0013 0.08 0.123 0.07 -0.059 0.01 0.045 0.007
(-0.01) (0.98) (1.50) (0.86) (-0.80) (0.14) (0.66) (0.10)
G7 GDP growth (-1) 0.116 0.038 0.018 0.025 0.005 -0.068 -0.08 -0.07
(0.76) (0.27) (0.13) (0.18) (0.04) (-0.58) (-0.72) (-0.63)
Debt (-1) -0.011* -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-1.84) (-1.11) (-1.33) (-1.54) (-1.42) (-1.05) (-1.22) (-1.20)
Δ Curr. G -0.433** -0.296**
(-2.55) (-2.10)
Δ Gov. Inv 0.082 0.046
(0.60) (0.41)
Δ Tax -0.22 -0.26
(-1.09) (-1.56)
Δ Pr. Deficit -0.044 -0.023 0.016 -0.027 0.006 0.024
(-0.33) (-0.19) (0.13) (-0.24) (0.06) (0.23)
Δ Curr G/Δ Pr Deficit  Curr.   Pr. De cit 0 017*** . 0 015*** .
(4.70) (4.81)
Δ Gov. Inv/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.0013 0.004
(0.28) (0.96)
Δ Curr. G + Δ Tax 0.34*** 0.284***
(3.80) (3.84)
Constant 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.03***
(3.85) (3.44) (2.97) (4.23) (4.90) (4.87) (4.28) (5.41)
Observations 88 88 88 88 83 83 83 83
R-squared 0.22 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.12 0.27 0.34 0.27
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: real GDP growth rate during the fiscal adjustment in columns 1-4; average real GDP growth rate during the fiscal adjustment and in the following two years
in columns 5-8. T-statistics in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variables.Table 10: GDP growth and the composition of a fiscal adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr. Avg. GDP gr.
GDP growth (-1) 0.208** 0.26*** 0.276** 0.127 0.187** 0.155*
(2.11) (2.99) (2.54) (1.58) (2.56) (1.80)
GDP growth (-2) 0.112 0.13 0.072 0.079 0.06 0.036
(1.26) (1.59) (0.74) (1.09) (0.88) (0.47)
G7 GDP growth (-1) 0.068 -0.05 0.108 -0.048 -0.15 -0.04
(0.44) (-0.37) (0.61) (-0.39) (-1.33) (-0.30)
Debt (-1) -0.013** -0.010* -0.013* -0.014** -0.008* -0.012*
(-2.08) (-1.74) (-1.95) (-2.43) (-1.69) (-1.99)
Δ Tran -0.057 -0.30
(-0.20) (-1.27)
Δ Gov. non wage exp. -1.53** -0.46
(-2.59) (-0.94)
Δ Gov. wage exp. -1.18*** -1.05***
(-2.66) (-2.85)
Δ Subsidies -1.98** -1.84***
(-2.61) (-2.93)
Δ Gov. Inv 0.044 -0.002
(0.32) (-0.02)
Δ Income taxes -0.016 0.04
(-0.06) (0.18)
Δ Bus. taxes -0.57* -0.79***
(-1.92) (-3.19)
Δ Soc. security contr. -0.04 -0.24
(-0.10) (-0.64)
Δ Indirect taxes -0.19 -0.37
(-0.43) () (-1.03) ()
Δ other taxes -0.27 0.106
(-0.50) (0.24)
Δ Pr. Deficit -0.084 0.051 -0.022 0.077
(-0.70) (0.35) (-0.22) (0.67)
Δ Tran/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.006 0.009*
(1.01) (1.93)
Δ Gov. non wage exp./Δ Pr. Deficit 0.025** 0.005
(2.23) (0.56)
Δ Gov. wage exp/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.026*** 0.022***
(3.16) (3.04)
Δ Subsidies/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.043*** 0.036***
(2.69) (2.66)
Δ Gov. Inv/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.0004 0.0026
(-0.08) (0.66)
Δ Income taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.009 -0.005
(-1.42) (-1.11)
Δ Bus. taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.011 -0.015*
(-1.16) (-1.84)
Δ Soc. security contr./Δ Pr. Deficit -0.01 -0.015*
(-1.04) (-1.93)
Δ Indirect taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit -0.015 -0.02***
(-1.62) (-2.68)
Δ other taxes/Δ Pr. Deficit 0.0012 0.0001
(0.11) (0.01)
Constant 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.03*** 0.025*** 0.04***
(3.29) (3.11) (3.99) (4.92) (4.56) (5.78)
Observations 81 88 80 77 83 76
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.28 0.41 0.38 0.26
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: real GDP growth rate during the fiscal adjustment in columns 1-3; average real GDP growth 
rate during the fiscal adjustment and in the following two years in columns 4-6. T-statistics in parenthesis. 
S h A di f h d fi i i f h i bl See the Data Appendix for the exact definition of the variables.Δ Inv 0.036
Table 11: GDP growth and fiscal policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 9
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
GDP growth (-1) 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.36***
(8.37) (9.24) (9.45) (8.14) (8.98) (9.21) (7.99) (8.77) (8.93)
GDP growth (-2) -0.038 0.016 0.014 -0.035 0.02 0.017 -0.03 0.026 0.025
(-0.91) (0.41) (0.36) (-0.84) (0.51) (0.43) (-0.71) (0.65) (0.62)
Debt (-1) -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(-1.09) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.04) (-1.22) (-1.27) (-1.10) (-1.28) (-1.39)
Δ Pr. Deficit -0.154*** -0.145*** -0.131** -0.136** -0.11 -0.14
(-3.98) (-3.99) (-1.99) (-2.19) (-1.08) (-1.58)
Tight*Δ Pr. Deficit 0.12 0.16
(0.74) (1.05)
Loose*Δ Pr. Deficit -0.213 -0.126
(-1.27) (-0.80)
Δ Curr. G -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51***
(-8.37) (-6.20) (-4.59)
Tight*Δ Curr. G 0.29
(1.48)
Loose*Δ Curr. G -0.25
(-1.21)
Δ Gov. Inv -0.07 -0.067 0.006
(-1.16) (-0.89) (0.04)
Tight*Δ Gov. Inv Tight  Gov.  0.036
(0.19)
Loose*Δ Gov. Inv -0.246
(-1.22)






Δ Curr. G + Δ Tax 0.314*** 0.312*** 0.315***
(8.36) (8.32) (7.05)
Tight*Δ Curr. G + Δ Tax -0.145
(-1.52)
Loose*Δ Curr. G + Δ Tax 0.124
(1.34)
Tight -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0020 0.0019 0.0006 0.0015
(-0.69) (-1.05) (-0.87) (0.52) (0.16) (0.44)
Loose -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.003 0.0014 0.002 0.0017
(-1.45) (-1.11) (-1.23) (0.35) (0.53) (0.44)
Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
R-squared 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.64 0.64
Notes: OLS regressions. Dep. var.: real GDP growth rate. Tight=1 in period of a fiscal adjustment, 0 otherwise. Loose = 1 in period of a fiscal stimulus, 0 otherwise. Country and year dummies included. T-stat in (). See Data Appendix.Fisca Adj men s
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